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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Robert Harper spends part of his time making deliveries 
for Amazon as a “flexible” driver, one of those once unknown, 
now ubiquitous, jobs of the twenty-first century.1 Harper 
alleges Amazon owes him wages and tips. Perhaps they do. But 
before answering that question, the District Court must first ask 
another: whether Harper’s claims belong in arbitration. This 
inquiry, as we hold today, respects the balance of authority 
between the several States and the United States and requires 
federal courts sitting in diversity to decide state law claims, 
including state arbitrability, even where the Federal Arbitration 
 
1 Amazon uses the “Amazon Flex” program to 
supplement its traditional delivery services by contracting with 
drivers for local deliveries in certain U.S. metro areas. 
https://flex.amazon.com/faq. Through a smartphone app, 
individuals sign up to make “last mile” deliveries of products 
from Amazon warehouses. (Opening Br. at 6.) Flex drivers 
also deliver groceries through Prime Now and Amazon Fresh 




Act (“FAA”) may apply. Doing so promotes both the 
competitive and cooperative aspects of Our Federalism, with 
appropriate “sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State 
and National Governments.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 
44 (1971). That is a threshold inquiry, ensuring prompt review 
of state law claims, particularly before turning to discovery to 
sort through a comparatively complex federal question. For 
that reason, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and 
remand to determine the arbitrability of Harper’s claim against 
Amazon under applicable state law. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Robert Harper runs deliveries for Amazon under the 
“Amazon Flex” program. (App. at 44.) Amazon Flex 
supplements Amazon’s traditional delivery services. Interested 
drivers use an app to sign up to drive packages from Amazon 
warehouses, affiliated grocers, and participating restaurants to 
home shoppers.  
Harper signed up as a driver through the Amazon Flex 
phone app, where he clicked on a brightly colored button 
stating, “I AGREE AND ACCEPT” (in all caps) following the 
Terms of Service. (Opening Br. at 7.) The Terms noted, with 
still more capitalization, that the Amazon Flex driver who 
accepts:  
AGREE[S] TO RESOLVE DISPUTES 
BETWEEN YOU AND AMAZON ON AN 
INDIVIDUAL BASIS THROUGH FINAL 
AND BINDING ARBITRATION, UNLESS 
YOU OPT OUT OF ARBITRATION WITHIN 
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14 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE EFFECTIVE 
DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT.2  
(App. at 62.) The Terms of Service also included 
language specifying that the parties “agree[d] that the Federal 
Arbitration Act and applicable federal law will govern any 
dispute that may arise between the parties.” (App. at 67.) And 
a choice-of-law provision provided that Washington law 
controls the rest of the Terms of Service. Harper admits that he 
agreed, clicking first to accept the full Terms and clicking 
again to confirm the arbitration clause. Still, he filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, alleging 
violations of New Jersey law. Amazon removed to federal 
court, claiming complete diversity. Pressing on, Harper filed a 
putative class action on behalf of similarly situated New Jersey 
Amazon Flex drivers, alleging that Amazon misclassified them 
as independent contractors when they really are employees, 
 
 2 Section 11(a) of the Terms of Services, labeled 
“Dispute Resolution, Submission to Arbitration,” explains that 
“subject to your right to opt out of arbitration, the parties will 
resolve by final and binding arbitration, rather than in court, 
any dispute or claim, whether based on contract, common law, 
or statute, arising out of or relating in any way to this 
agreement, including termination of this agreement, . . . to your 
participation in the program or to your performance of 
services.” (App. at 66.) Section 11(b) adds that “to the extent 
permitted by law, the parties agree that any dispute resolution 
proceedings will be conducted only on an individual basis and 
not on a class or collective basis.” (App. at 66.) For added 
punch, both sections also appear in ALL CAPS, an extravagant 




and that Amazon failed to pay overtime, minimum wage, and 
customer tips, in violation of New Jersey labor laws.  
Amazon moved to enforce the arbitration clause in the 
Terms and compel arbitration under the FAA. Harper objected, 
arguing that New Jersey Amazon Flex drivers fall within the 
exemption for a “class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce” provided in 9 U.S.C. § 1 because they 
make some deliveries across state lines. Amazon disagreed 
with that construction of federal law. But no matter, the 
company added, because the claim is also arbitrable under state 
law. Interpreting our prior decisions, the District Court denied 
Amazon’s motion to compel arbitration. Construing the issue 
as one of fact, the District Court ordered discovery to 
determine whether Harper falls within the § 1 exception to the 
FAA by, among other acts, making deliveries from New Jersey 
to New York. The District Court declined to reach Amazon’s 
alternative argument about state law, and Amazon timely 
appealed.3 
 
3 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1332(d)(2). We have jurisdiction over 
this appeal of an order denying the motion to compel 
arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). We have pendent 
jurisdiction over whether arbitration may be compelled under 
state law when “state law issues arise from a single arbitration 
agreement that provides alternative grounds for the arbitration 
of all claims.” Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 
594 (3d Cir. 2004). Review of these state law issues “is 
necessary to ensure meaningful review of the District Court’s 
order in its entirety.” Id. at 595. We review the District Court’s 
order compelling arbitration de novo. Singh v. Uber Techs. 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
Congress limited the scope of the FAA by exempting 
the employment contracts of certain classes of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. Whether that 
exemption applies is a question of law that, ordinarily, does not 
require fact-finding through discovery. Nor does the FAA 
require courts to ignore state law grounds for enforcing an 
agreement to arbitrate. Both issues require more consideration 
by the District Court on remand. 
A. Section 1 of the FAA 
 The FAA does not apply “to contracts of employment 
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. It is 
a “very particular qualification” attributed to pre-existing 
“alternative employment dispute resolution regimes for many 
transportation workers.” New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. 
Ct. 532, 537 (2019). Adding to § 1’s language, we have applied 
the exception to cover employees in any transportation 
industry who “engage[] in the movement of interstate or 
foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be 
in practical effect part of it.” Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. 
Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., (U.E.) Local 437, 207 F.2d 
450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953) (en banc). Since then, the Supreme 
Court has cautioned courts to “construe the ‘engaged in 
commerce’ language in the FAA with reference to the statutory 
 
Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 2019). In doing so, “[w]e apply 
the same standard as the District Court, so we are first obliged 
to determine which standard should have been applied [in 




context in which it is found and in a manner consistent with the 
FAA’s purpose.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105, 118 (2001). Applying this framework, the Court has held 
“that the § 1 exclusion provision [should] be afforded a narrow 
construction.” Id.; see also Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 
970 F.3d 798, 800–02 (7th Cir. 2020).  
 Equally important, the “inquiry regarding § 1’s residual 
clause asks a court to look to classes of workers rather than 
particular workers.” Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 
227 (3d Cir. 2019); see also Wallace, 970 F.3d at 800 (Section 
1 asks “not whether the individual worker actually engaged in 
interstate commerce, but whether the class of workers to which 
the complaining worker belonged engaged in interstate 
commerce.” (quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). That 
limitation flows from the ordinary meaning of § 1, which 
includes the “other class of workers engaged in . . . commerce” 
as a “residual phrase, following, in the same sentence, explicit 
reference to ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees.’” Circuit City, 
532 U.S. at 114.  
Determining whether § 1’s exclusion applies is a 
threshold inquiry because “a court must first know whether the 
contract itself falls within or beyond the boundaries of §§ 1 and 
2.” New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 537. Doing so requires construing 
the ordinary meaning of § 1, as interpreted by our decisions,4 a 
 
4 A line of cases dating to the 1953 en banc decision in 
Tenney holds that § 1 exempts all transportation-industry 
employees who engage in “work so closely related [to 
interstate or foreign commerce] as to be in practical effect part 
of it” from the FAA’s reach. 207 F.2d at 452. Later, our Court 
reaffirmed Tenney’s construction of § 1 while concluding that 
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question of law that typically can be resolved without facts 
outside the well-pleaded complaint. Singh, 939 F.3d at 219 
(discussing Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 
716 F.3d 764 (3d Cir. 2013)). That inquiry turns on multiple 
factors informing the sort of “work so closely related” to 
interstate or foreign transportation, such as the parties’ 
agreement, and the “industry in which the class of workers is 
engaged.” Id. at 227–28. And “when it is apparent, based on 
the face of a complaint, and documents relied upon in the 
complaint, that certain of a party’s claims are subject to an 
enforceable arbitration clause, a motion to compel arbitration 
should be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard without 
discovery’s delay.” Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). But in some cases, where the scope 
of the class of workers at issue cannot be determined by 
examining the nature of the work performed by the class, and 
by comparison to the rail and sea industries specified by 
Congress, “limited discovery” “restricted” to facts about the 
class of workers may be ordered. Singh, 939 F.3d at 218–19. 
Here, the District Court held Harper met the Singh standard for 
discovery. Following that path is understandable, and 
 
a Philadelphia-area supervisor for an international shipping 
company was a “transportation worker engaged in interstate 
and foreign commerce” exempt from the FAA. Palcko, 372 
F.3d at 593–94. Most recently, Singh described Tenney as 
“unequivocal that the residual clause of § 1 excludes the 
contracts of employment of transportation workers who 
transport passengers from the FAA.” Singh, 939 F.3d at 222. 
All drawing a straight line from Tenney to Harper’s argument 
that Amazon Flex drivers making local, last-few-mile-only 




discovery may indeed show whether Harper belongs to a class 
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce in the 
same way as seamen and railroad workers. But when state law 
grounds exist that would enforce arbitration even if the FAA 
does not apply, courts must turn to that threshold question 
under Guidotti before ordering discovery. Doing so honors the 
principles of federalism and the expectations of the parties. We 
turn next to those concepts.  
B. The Co-Equal Role of Arbitration Under State Law 
Assume, Amazon argues, that the § 1 exemption 
applies. If so, the parties might still have an enforceable 
agreement to arbitrate under state law. And if that is so, then 
why not answer that question of law before turning to 
discovery, mindful that fact-finding can always come later if 
necessary? We agree and hold this question must be resolved 
before turning to discovery. 
1. The Scope of FAA Preemption 
Begin with the scope of FAA preemption in § 2 of the 
Act.5 Not all state laws, only laws that conflict with the FAA, 
are “displaced.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333, 341 (2011). A state law enforcing arbitration, like New 
Jersey’s Arbitration Act (“NJAA”), creates no conflict. See 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–
46 (2006); Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford 
 
 5 9 U.S.C. § 2 states that agreements to arbitrate “in any 
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.” 
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Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989). That is because “pre-
emption analysis is not a freewheeling judicial inquiry into 
whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives, but 
an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and 
federal law conflict.” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 
U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). In short, “[t]he FAA contains no express pre-
emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to 
occupy the entire field of arbitration.” Volt, 489 U.S. at 477. 
As with nearly all aspects of our republic, state and federal law 
here complement, rather than conflict.  
That balance is seen here. If the § 1 exclusion applies, 
then the FAA does not. But the parties still have an agreement 
to arbitrate, and if federal law does not govern the arbitrability 
of their contract, some law must.   
 2. Choosing the Applicable Law 
So what law applies? The agreement between Harper 
and Amazon answers that question or, at least, it tells us how 
the question will be answered. Recall how the agreement came 
to be. Working under the Amazon Flex program starts with a 
downloaded app and a few clicks. To join, willing drivers must 
accept the Terms of Service, agreeing to “resolve disputes” 
with Amazon “through final and binding arbitration.” (App. at 
62.) The Terms of Service state that “the Federal Arbitration 
Act and applicable federal law will govern any dispute that 
may arise between the parties.” (App. at 67.) Everything else 
is governed by Washington law. (See App. at 67.) The Terms 
of Service are severable, and “[i]f any provision of th[e] 
Agreement is determined to be unenforceable,” the rest of the 
agreement must “be enforced as if the unenforceable 
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provisions were not present [such] that any partially valid and 
enforceable provisions [are] enforced to the fullest extent 
permissible under applicable law.” (App. at 68.) 
In this language, Harper sees a hole that defeats the 
parties’ bargain. He argues that because the agreement selects 
the FAA to govern arbitration, there is no law to apply if the § 
1 exemption takes the FAA out. Two problems arise from that 
contention. First, state law grounds for arbitration may exist. 
Generally,  a court can only determine whether state law 
provides grounds for arbitration by deciding what state law 
applies using the rules of the forum state. Gen. Ceramics Inc. 
v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Companies, 66 F.3d 647, 652 (3d Cir. 
1995) (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 
(1941)). That is because our federal system “leaves to a state, 
within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to 
pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors.” 
Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. When engaging in substantive 
contractual interpretation, a federal court must look to the 
choice-of-law rules of the forum state, even where the contract 
includes a choice-of-law clause. Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 
F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 2017). That duty remains when the FAA 
is part of the contract because “[t]here is no language in the 
FAA that explicitly preempts the enforcement of state 
arbitration statutes.” Palcko, 372 F.3d at 595. Finding the § 1 
exemption applies does not mean all state law about arbitration 
vanishes. “[E]ven if an arbitration agreement is outside the 
FAA, the agreement still may be enforced.” Cole v. Burns Int’l 
Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
Second, and specifically, the Terms of Service need not 
be read to hinge arbitrability on the application of federal law. 
Equally plausible is a reading that creates an obligation to 
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arbitrate all disputes and a separate, possibly severable, choice 
of federal law.6 One term need not depend on the other.  
Of course, that does not mean Washington law controls, 
or that Harper and Amazon have an agreement to arbitrate 
under state law at all. These are questions best considered by 
the District Court. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 
(1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate 
court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”). A 
remand to fully consider arbitration under state law grounds is 
appropriate and, it turns out, agreeable to the parties.7 More 
importantly, it is what federalism requires of a federal court 
sitting in diversity jurisdiction on a state law claim. 
 
6 Looking at this same contract, two circuits so far have 
reached opposite conclusions on the severability question. 
Compare Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 27 (1st 
Cir. 2020) (“Amazon’s shortcomings in drafting the 
Agreement do not alter our ultimate conclusion . . . . Because 
the FAA is inapplicable, the portions of the governing law and 
dispute resolution sections selecting the FAA must be stricken 
from the Agreement, leaving Washington law as the default 
choice of law . . . .”), with Rittman v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 
F.3d 904, 920 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Because it is not clear that the 
parties intended to apply Washington law to the arbitration 
provision in the event the FAA did not apply, we construe 
ambiguity in the contract against Amazon to avoid that 
result.”). 
 7 As acknowledged by the parties at argument. 
(Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–28, Harper v. Amazon.com 




3. State Law Questions of Arbitrability Should Be 
Resolved First 
Finally, state law arbitration questions must be resolved 
before turning to questions of fact and discovery.8 Fairly, the 
District Court opted to resolve the applicability of the FAA 
before diving into a choice-of-law analysis. That sequencing 
 
 8 Our dissenting colleague argues that “binding 
precedent supports the sequence that the District Court 
followed.” (Dissent at 3.) We agree that it was proper to assess 
the FAA’s applicability in the first instance. But no binding 
precedent requires district courts to ignore arbitrability under 
state law when the applicability of § 1 is uncertain. That 
sequencing question was asked, but not answered by the First 
Circuit in New Prime. Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 
24 (1st Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019). And the 
Supreme Court in New Prime did not discuss, let alone decide, 
the matter. Rather, the Court outlined the order of analysis for 
FAA provisions and doctrines, but said nothing about when 
state law arbitrability must be addressed. 139 S. Ct. at 537–38 
(holding that §§ 1 & 2 come before §§ 3 & 4 and the FAA’s 
“severability” doctrine). Indeed, no court has suggested that 
New Prime requires that we determine “whether [§ 1] applies 
before turning to state law.” (Dissent at 4.) Nor have we 
previously addressed how district courts should consider state 
law arbitrability when faced with a cloud of § 1 uncertainty. 
The issue did not arise in Palcko, where we affirmed the district 
court’s conclusion that the contract was exempt under § 1 
before turning to state law. 372 F.3d at 594–96. And 
sequencing was not before us in Singh either, see 939 F.3d at 
228, although the concurrence flagged the issue. Id. at 231 
(Porter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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replaces a possibly challenging set of legal questions with an 
almost certainly burdensome set of factual disputes and opens 
the door to the delays, costs, and uncertainty an enforceable 
arbitration clause seeks to avoid. Guidotti, incorporated into 
the analysis of the § 1 claims in Singh, counsels a different 
course.  
Recall that Singh adopts the test outlined in Guidotti, 
requiring courts to resolve a motion to compel arbitration 
“under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard without discovery’s delay” 
when only facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient for a 
decision as a matter of law. Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In challenges to arbitrability under § 
1, that creates a three-part framework. At step one, using the 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation to analyze the facts 
of the complaint, a court must consider whether the agreement 
applies to a class of transportation workers who “engaged 
directly in commerce” or “work so closely related thereto as to 
be in practical effect part of it.” Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452. If the 
class is outside that definition, then § 1 does not apply, and 
cannot serve as a defense to a motion to compel arbitration. If 
that analysis leads to murky answers, a court moves to step two 
and assumes § 1 applies, taking the FAA out of the agreement. 
But the court then considers whether the contract still requires 
arbitration under any applicable state law. After all, the parties’ 
primary agreement is to arbitrate their disputes, so courts 
should explore both contractual routes to effectuate that 
agreement when one is called into question. If the arbitration 
clause is also unenforceable under state law, then the court 
reaches step three, and must return to federal law and decide 
whether § 1 applies, a determination that may benefit from 
limited and restricted discovery on whether the class of 




Reasonably, the District Court focused on the facts 
surrounding the class of workers to which Harper belongs. Our 
decision today clarifies the steps courts should follow––before 
discovery about the scope of § 1––when the parties’ agreement 
reveals a clear intent to arbitrate. We reiterate that our decision 
does not suggest any particular view of the parties’ agreement, 
only the route to follow. Whether Harper and Amazon must 
arbitrate their dispute is a matter of both federal and state law, 
an analysis best considered by the District Court. For these 
reasons, we will vacate the order denying the motion to compel 
arbitration and remand for consideration under state law. 
MATEY, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
Nearly a century has passed since Congress codified the 
ancient practice1 of arbitration. Since then, federal courts have 
engaged in a tug-of-war that expands both the reach of, and the 
exceptions to, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The result 
is uncertainty, with the text drafted by Congress replaced by 
presumptions that encourage unpredictability and foster rising 
costs. Respectfully, since the courts created this problem, we 
should help clean it up. Some have already called for an 
examination of the presumption amplifying the modest 
command that an agreement to resolve a controversy through 
arbitration “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable”2 into 
a wide-ranging displacement of private agreements and state 
law. See Calderon v. Sixt Rent a Car, LLC, 5 F.4th 1204, 1215–
21 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., concurring). An expansion 
that may well run directly into the textual guarantee of trial 
rights.3 Returning § 2 to its ordinary, best meaning could avoid 
that tension and restore the FAA to its stated reach.  
 
 1 See 14 Sir William S. Holdsworth, History of English 
Law 187 (1964) (“Early Roman and English law retain traces 
of the time when the natural way of settling disputes was self-
help, and recourse to a court depended on the consent of the 
parties.”) And this “process of jury-avoidance” continued “into 
the colonial era.” Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of 
Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury 
Trial, 22 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 811, 845 & n.227 (2014). 
 2 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 3 “It has been often said by this court that the trial by 
jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the 
people. Consequently, every reasonable presumption should be 
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Similarly, reconsidering our decision in Tenney Eng’g, 
Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., (U.E.) 
Local 437, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (en banc) presents an 
opportunity to return the exception in 9 U.S.C. § 1 to its textual 
parameters. Writing in a different era, and relying on analogy 
to the different formulation of the Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908), Tenney’s construction 
of § 1 sweeps in a broader class of workers from a wider range 
of industries than the text allows. And with the rise of Internet-
based commerce, Tenney’s command to examine whether the 
work at issue is “closely related” to the transportation of 
interstate commerce could eventually make the exception to 
arbitration the new rule.  
 
indulged against its waiver.” Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. (16 
Otto) 408, 412 (1882). Contrast this with the presumption, 
found nowhere in the text of the FAA, “that questions of 
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the 
federal policy favoring arbitration” because the Act 
“establishes that, as a matter of federal law any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). 
Instead, the presumption appears drawn from portions of 
legislative history. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 
13–14 (1984). That might explain much of the haze that now 
covers the text. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 
S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (“Even those of us who sometimes 
consult legislative history will never allow it to be used to 
‘muddy’ the meaning of ‘clear statutory language.’” (quoting 
Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011))).  
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Reconsidering the judicially created presumptions atop 
both §§ 1 and 2 of the FAA would bring everyone back to the 
starting line in the text of the law. And applying the text as 
written will allow Congress to consider whether new words are 
needed about the scope of arbitration in the twenty-first 
century.  
I.  DETERMINING THE BEST READING OF 9 U.S.C. § 1 
 While the challenges presented by the judicially 
magnified presumptions of § 2 deserve a fresh look, that issue 
is not before us. The similarly stretched scope of § 1 is. And 
since our distant decision in Tenney seems to be at the root of 
more recent expansions of the exception, its reconsideration is 
warranted.  
A. The Ordinary Path of Interpretation  
 In drafting the FAA, Congress included a specific 
exception for “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. Normally, we approach the 
work of statutory construction with a single mission to 
“interpret the words consistent with their ordinary meaning . . 
. at the time Congress enacted the statute.” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070 (2018) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United 
States v. Smukler, 991 F.3d 472, 482–83 (3d Cir. 2021). 
Context aids that mission, as “the meaning of a sentence [is] 
more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than 
the notes.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 
1827 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). As the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly directed, any matter of statutory interpretation 
comes with “an important caution in mind” that “if judges 
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could freely invest old statutory terms with new meanings, we 
would risk amending legislation outside the ‘single, finely 
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure’ the 
Constitution commands.” New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. 
Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 
(1983)). 
B. Tenney’s Analogy  
But sometimes a prior judicial decision colors our 
conclusions. See United States v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 
1142–43 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the 
judgment). That is the case with § 1 and the nearly seven-
decade-old decision in Tenney, involving a suit by a 
manufacturer against a labor union for breach of contract. The 
contract included an arbitration clause, a right invoked by the 
union. Seeking to avoid arbitration, the employer argued the 
workers fell under § 1 exemption. 207 F.2d at 452. Tenney 
answered that question not through textual construction, but by 
analogy, looking to the definition of “commerce” in FELA. Id. 
at 453. Tenney concluded Congress “must have had [FELA] in 
mind” when drafting the residual clause in § 1 of the FAA, 
given that Congress “incorporat[ed] almost exactly the same 
phraseology,” that is, “engaged in commerce” and “engaged in 
interstate commerce,” respectively. Id. Tenney then applied a 
test from a single FELA case to expand the inquiry from 
whether the employee was engaged in interstate transportation 
to whether the employee was engaged in interstate 
transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be 
practically a part of it. Id. (citing Shanks v. Del., Lackawanna 
& W. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558 (1916)).  
As a result, the exception for “seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
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interstate commerce” now applies to all employees in any 
industry who “engage in interstate commerce” or “work so 
closely related thereto as to be in practical effect part of it.” Id. 
at 452. See also Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 227–
28 (3d Cir. 2019) (creating a multifactor test to answer the 
calculation posed by the Tenney formula). And that is the path 
courts now understandably follow into discovery to figure out 
what is, or is not, closely related to the increasingly borderless 
commercial world. With digital platforms providing 
consumers access to a global selection of goods and services, 
that inquiry seems likely to stump both district courts and 
litigants. Indeed, one might ask whether even the most local of 
main-street shops that elects to sell its goods, advertise its 
services, or collect its payments electronically is instantly 
transformed into “foreign or interstate commerce.” What do we 
say when the local package store signs up to deliver alcohol 
through Drizly to customers ordering online but living blocks 
away?4 If hard questions about the scope of the FAA arise from 
 
4 Drizly recruits local stores to provide alcohol to 
“millions of customers looking to buy online from their local 
liquor store and get delivery to their door.” Become a Drizly 
Retail Partner, https://bevalcinsights.com/become-a-drizly-
retail-partner (last visited Sept. 2, 2021). During the COVID-
19 pandemic, Drizly became the “favorite on-demand alcohol 
delivery service” known for their speed, large selection, and 
also “local picks from each area they’re in — including local 
breweries, tasting rooms, and distilleries.” Taylor Galla, Tyler 
Schoeber, & Nina Bradley, The Best Alcohol Delivery Services 
to Ensure You’ll Never Be Without Your Favorite Booze, 
Yahoo, Aug. 6, 2021, https://www.yahoo 
.com/lifestyle/best-alcohol-delivery-services-ensure-
200014005.html.   
6 
 
enjoying a six-pack, it seems fair to ask whether we are on the 
right road.  
C. The Text of the FAA 
 There is, however, a better route drawn only from the 
text of the FAA. Remembering that “the words of a statute 
must be read in their context and with a view to their place in 
the overall statutory scheme,” Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs. v. 
Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1888 (2019) (quoting Roberts v. Sea-
Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012)), I would examine 
the ordinary meaning of the § 1 exclusion in the context of the 
FAA.  
1. Congress Drafted § 1 to Accommodate Existing 
Federal Laws 
 Recall the somewhat unusual phrasing of § 1: “nothing” 
in the FAA “shall apply” to “contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” A precise 
definition, the exclusion is written to harmonize the 
“alternative employment dispute resolution regimes for many 
transportation workers” Congress created before adopting the 
FAA in 1925. New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 537 (discussing Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001)). We 
know that because “[t]he wording of § 1 calls for the 
application of the maxim ejusdem generis, the statutory canon 
that where general words follow specific words in a 
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to 
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects 
enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Circuit City, 532 
U.S. at 114–15 (cleaned up). Using this “maxim,” that residual 
clause of “any other class of workers engaged in . . . 
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commerce” is “controlled and defined by reference to the 
enumerated categories of workers which are recited just before 
it.” Id. at 115. Unsurprisingly, the categories of “seamen” and 
“railroad employees” have historical meaning informing the 
scope of the § 1 exemption and underscoring Congress’s 
understanding of its legislative authority to regulate commerce 
at the time of the FAA.  
Take “seamen,” commonly understood as any “sailor” 
or “mariner”5 who “assists in managing ships at sea.”6 It was 
also “a maritime term of art” with an “established meaning” 
when Congress enacted the Jones Act in 1920,7 providing “a 
 
5 Seaman, Laird & Lee’s Webster’s New Standard 
Dictionary of the English Language 316 (1925). 
6 Seaman, Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 870 (3d ed. 
1925). See also Seaman, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019) (“(bef. 12c) . . . a person who is attached to a navigating 
vessel as an employee below the rank of officer and contributes 
to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its 
mission.”). 
7 The “Jones Act” is the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 
Pub. L. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988. The Jones Act did not define 
“seaman” because “Congress intended the term to have its 
established meaning under the general maritime law at the time 
the Jones Act was enacted.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 
347, 355 (1995). And general maritime law had long 
recognized a seaman as “a mariner of any degree, one who 
lives his life upon the sea,” including both masters and 
crewmen, Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 157 (1934), or more 
specifically a “person . . . employed on board a vessel in 
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cause of action in negligence for ‘any seaman’ injured ‘in the 
course of his employment.’” McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 
498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991);8 Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 
157–59 (1934). Likewise, “railroad employees,” a term 
encompassing workers “engaged in the customary work 
directly contributory to the operation of the railroads.” New 
Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543 & n.11, n.12 (citing Railway 
Employees’ Dept., A.F. of L. v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., 
Decision No. 982, 3 R.L.B. 332, 337 (1922) and Erdman Act, 
Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424). So by the arrival of 
the FAA, both “seamen” and “railroad employees” were 
already defined by Congress. 
And those definitions included procedures for resolving 
disputes. Congress addressed arbitration of seamen’s claims in 
the Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, §§ 25–26, 
17 Stat. 262, 267, see Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121, while the 
Jones Act of 1920 provided “heightened legal protections 
(unavailable to other maritime workers) that seamen receive 
because of their exposure to the perils of the sea,” and their 
“peculiar relationship to the vessel.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 
515 U.S. 347, 354–55 (1995) (internal quotations omitted). 
That excluded “land-based maritime workers” who instead 
enjoyed protection under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act of 1927. Wilander, 498 U.S. at 347–48; 
Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 154 F.3d 143, 147–
 
furtherance of its purpose.” McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 
498 U.S. 337, 346 (1991). 
8 McDermott is quoting 46 App. § 688, recodified at 46 




48 (3d Cir. 1998). Simply summarized, Congress exempted 
seamen from the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act because they “preferred the remedy for 
damages under the [Jones Act].” Warner, 293 U.S. at 159–60.  
“Railroad employee” disputes were addressed by 
Congress in the Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 152, 
41 Stat. 456 et seq., and then, “endeavor[ing] to establish a 
more practicable plan” to manage railroad labor relations, in 
the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) of 1926. Tex. & New Orleans 
R. Co. v. Bhd of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 560–63 (1930). The 
RLA defined “employees” to include “every person in the 
service of a carrier (subject to its continuing authority to 
supervise and direct the manner of rendition of his service) who 
performs any work defined as that of an employee or 
subordinate official in the orders of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.” Railway Labor Act, § 1, Pub. L. No. 257, 44 
Stat. 577 (1926) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 151).9 Not fifteen 
years later, Congress amended the RLA to clarify the bounds 
of “employees,” adding that “the term ‘employee’ shall not 
include any individual while such individual is engaged in the 
physical operations” related to coal mining, preparation, and 
handling. Pub. L. No. 764, 54 Stat. 785, 786 (1940). Those 
definitions, largely unchanged today, referred only to a person 
 
9 The definition of “employee” incorporates the 
definition of “carrier,” which refers to “any express company, 
sleeping-car company, and any carrier by railroad . . . including 
all floating equipment such as boats, barges, tugs, bridges and 
ferries; and other transportation facilities used by or operated 
in connection with any such carrier by railroad. . . .” Pub. L. 
No. 257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926). 
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within the railroad industry. See New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543 
& n.11, n.12.10  
 All this to say that “seamen” and “railroad employees” 
were not random examples of the industries exempted from the 
FAA. Rather, they are specific classes of workers already 
subject to complex dispute-resolution schemes. The common 
key between both is “workers over whom the commerce power 
was most apparent.” Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 120. Congress 
tied the exception in § 1 not to a general notion of commercial 
conduct, or even transportation in general, but to the kinds of 
 
10 That understanding tracks the text of the statute, as 
“railroad” was understood to refer to “transport by train.” 
Railroad, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (definition 
of “railroad” dating to 1838); see also Railroad, Bouvier’s Law 
Dictionary (8th ed. 1914) (“A railroad company is defined as 
an association of men who engage in the business of hauling 
passengers and freight.”) It also follows judicial interpretations 
of railroad-related statutes. See generally Wells Fargo & Co. 
v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1920) (discussing the 
differences between a common carrier and an express company 
conducting business on, but not operating, a railroad and 
concluding the latter was not a “common carrier by railroad” 
under the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908); see also Edwards 
v. Pac. Fruit Express Co., 390 U.S. 538, 540–41 (1968) 
(characterizing the list of businesses found in the RLA 
definition of “carriers” (express companies, sleeping-car 
companies, carriers by railroad) to encompass “activities and 
facilities intimately associated with the business of common 
carrier by railroad”). 
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transportation work within “Congress’ undoubted authority to 
govern.” Id. at 120. Having already passed laws to address the 
disputes of these industries uniquely within the Article I, § 8 
commerce power, Congress understandably exempted those 
same transportation workers from the new FAA “for the simple 
reason that it did not wish to unsettle established or developing 
statutory dispute resolution schemes covering specific 
workers.” Id. at 121. Tenney fights that narrow construction 
and, in adding those who “work so closely related” to the class 
of rail and sea workers identified, also runs into the limits on 
Congress’s legislative authority over commerce.11  
 2. The FAA Exemption Focuses on Class  
 Informed by history, and framed in context of the entire 
FAA, Tenney’s expansive reach is difficult to square with the 
limits on Congress’s commerce power and the “narrow 
 
 11 When the FAA was adopted, the Commerce Clause 
was seen as “a limit on state legislation that discriminated 
against interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 553 (1995); see also id. at 554 (citing Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942)). It was not until the 
watershed case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. that 
the Court held that intrastate activities that “have such a close 
and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their 
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce 
from burdens and obstructions” are within Congress’s 
regulatory power. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). The understanding of 
interstate commerce before Jones & Laughlin would not have 
been as broad as the Tenney formulation. 
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construction” of the § 1 exemption repeatedly, and recently, 
provided by the Supreme Court. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118; 
see also Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798, 
800–02 (7th Cir. 2020); Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 
F.3d 904, 931–33 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bress, J., dissenting). So 
what is the best reading of § 1? The answer appears in the text: 
whether a “class of workers,” not any individual worker, is 
“engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” as an ordinary and 
regular part of the class of work. That turns our focus away 
from the kind of businesses to the class of workers employed 
by the firm engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. True, 
tricky questions about some worker classes may persist. But 
those questions should focus on the class of work performed, 
rather than the function of individual workers or the scope of a 
company’s operations.  
 That focus on “class,” not individual work, follows 
from the residual clause, which the Supreme Court told us 
should be “controlled and defined by reference to the 
enumerated categories of workers which are recited just before 
it.” Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115. We are then instructed to 
apply ejusdem generis, id. at 114, to find the sorts of workers 
who are like “seamen” and “railroad employees”: the Court 
called them “transportation workers.” Id. at 119. 
To figure out who is a “transportation worker,” we must 
ask whether a plaintiff is in the class of workers “actually 
engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.” 
Id. at 112. Section 1 should apply, then, to employment 
contracts of a class of workers “actually engaged in the 
movement of goods in interstate commerce in the same way 
that seamen and railroad workers are.” Asplundh Tree Expert 
Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d. 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1995). Is the interstate 
movement of goods a “central part of the class members’ job 
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description”? Wallace, 970 F.3d at 801. Does the class of 
workers operate “in a cross-boundary capacity” the way 
seamen and railroad workers do? Rittman, 971 F.3d at 927 
(Bress, J., dissenting).  
These are the questions to ask under an ordinary reading 
of the statute. Questions that Tenney takes out of the equation 
in favor of an examination of work in general. Respectfully, it 
is appropriate to reconsider that result before businesses 
serving wine connoisseurs, pizza lovers, Etsy enthusiasts, and 
home shoppers all find themselves redefined as sailors. A 
result avoided by the best reading of § 1.  
II. CONCLUSION 
 Returning the FAA to its original meaning will likely 
displease those hoping to avoid the courtrooms where judges 
and juries have resolved disputes since the Founding. Nor will 
it satisfy those looking to exempt ever-more employees from 
arbitration. Enforcing rather than editing laws does not always 
please every crowd. See Lawrence B. Solum, Surprising 
Originalism: The Regula Lecture, 9 ConLawNOW 235, 256–
57 (2018). It does, however, give everyone fair notice of the 
rules. Perhaps the time has come for a different approach to 
arbitration than the framework Congress created in 1926. If so, 
that change must come from Congress. While that question is 
considered, respectfully, courts can return the FAA to its 
ordinary meaning and give ordinary workers the benefits and 
obligations of arbitration written into law. 
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SHWARTZ, J., dissenting.  
 
Robert Harper delivered packages for Amazon.  
Delivery drivers like Harper operated under a “Terms of 
Service” agreement (“TOS”).  Section 11 of the TOS was 
entitled “Arbitration Agreement.”  It provided, among other 
things, that the driver and Amazon would resolve disputes 
through “final and binding arbitration.”  App. 62 
(capitalization omitted).  The parties further “agree[d] that the 
Federal Arbitration Act [“FAA”] and applicable federal law 
will govern any dispute that may arise between the parties.”  
App. 67.  Section 12 had a separate choice of law provision 
that applied to the remainder of the TOS.  It stated that the TOS 
is “governed by the law of the state of Washington without 
regard to its conflict of laws principles, except for [the 
arbitration provision] . . . which is governed by the [FAA] and 
applicable federal law.”  App. 67.  Thus, the TOS contemplated 
that federal law would govern the arbitration provision.   
 
Harper filed a complaint alleging that Amazon violated 
the New Jersey wage and hour laws.  In response, Amazon 
moved to compel arbitration based on federal and state law.  
The District Court examined the TOS, observed that the FAA 
“govern[ed] all disputes related to arbitration,” App. 18, and 
attempted to determine whether Harper is a member of a class 
of workers that are exempt from the FAA under § 1’s residual 
clause, 9 U.S.C. § 1.  Because the pleadings lacked sufficient 
facts to determine whether the FAA applied, the District Court 
ordered limited discovery on this issue, consistent with Singh 
v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019).  The 
Court further determined that it would decide if the FAA 
applies before addressing whether Washington or New Jersey 
law would compel arbitration absent the FAA.   
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    My colleagues agree that the District Court properly 
applied Singh but say that the Court erred in allowing 
discovery to proceed before deciding whether state law would 
compel arbitration.  As a result, they have vacated the Court’s 
order and directed it to examine what could be tricky state law 
issues1 before even determining that the parties’ chosen federal 
law does not apply.  While I fully understand the goals of 
arbitration and the desire to expeditiously resolve cases, 
compelling arbitration here is possible only because of the 
parties’ contract, which itself provides that the FAA governs 
the arbitration provision.  Because the District Court followed 
the plain language of that contract and faithfully applied 
binding precedent, there is no reason to require the Court to 
examine state law at this point.  As a result, I respectfully 
dissent for three reasons. 
 
1 The two Courts of Appeals that have examined the 
same contract reached different conclusions on what state’s 
law, if any, applies to the arbitration provision absent 
application of the FAA.  Compare Rittmann v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 920-21 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding, after 
determining that Amazon Flex drivers are exempt from the 
FAA, that there was no agreement to arbitrate under state law 
and thus “there is no [state] law that governs the arbitration 
provision”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1374 (2021) (Mem.), with 
Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 26-35 (1st Cir. 
2020) (concluding, after determining that Amazon Flex drivers 
are exempt from the FAA, that Washington law applies to the 
arbitration provision, and then conducting a conflicts-of-law 
analysis between Washington law and the law of the forum 
state, Massachusetts, and applying the forum’s law), cert. 
denied, --- S. Ct. ----, No. 20-1077, 2021 WL 2519107 (U.S. 
June 21, 2021). 
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 First, the TOS’s arbitration provision states that the 
parties will resolve disputes through arbitration under the FAA 
and applicable federal law.  Importantly, the TOS’s choice of 
law clause disclaims the applicability of Washington law to 
arbitration issues and repeats that the FAA governs the TOS’s 
arbitration provision.  The District Court’s decision to first 
determine whether the FAA applies appropriately sought to 
effectuate the plain language of the agreement, a core tenet of 
common law contractual interpretation.  See Pacifico v. 
Pacifico, 920 A.2d 73, 77 (N.J. 2007); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 
P.2d 222, 226 (Wash. 1990).2  To do otherwise would be 
contrary to the agreement’s clear text.3 
 
 Second, binding precedent supports the sequence that 
the District Court followed by first seeking to determine 
whether the parties’ chosen law, here, the FAA, applies.    Start 
with New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).  There, 
the Supreme Court examined whether a delegation clause 
permits an arbitrator to decide whether the FAA applies, i.e., 
whether the class of workers is exempt from the FAA under § 
1.  The Court held that the applicability of an exemption is an 
“antecedent question” and specifically stated that “a court 
should decide for itself whether § 1’s . . . exclusion applies 
 
2 Because the parties dispute whether, absent 
application of the FAA, New Jersey or Washington law may 
apply to the arbitration provision, I cite both Washington and 
New Jersey law.   
3 Additionally, even if ambiguous, any ambiguities in 
the contract are construed against the drafter, here, Amazon.  
See, e.g., Dennis v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 503 P.2d 1114, 1117 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1972); see also Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 920 
(construing this ambiguity against Amazon). 
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before ordering arbitration.”  Id. at 537.  The Court further 
stated that “before invoking the severability principle, a court 
should determine[] that the contract in question is within the 
coverage of the” FAA.  Id. at 538 (alteration in original and 
quotation marks and citations omitted).4  Thus, New Prime 
teaches that if the parties have selected the FAA as the 
governing law, a court should first examine whether it applies 
before turning to state law. 
 
Relying on New Prime, we have reached the same 
conclusion.  In Singh, the parties, like the parties here, entered 
an agreement that “state[d] that the FAA would govern” the 
arbitration agreement.  939 F.3d at 216.  Based on that choice 
and the lean factual record, we determined that we would 
“leave it to the District Court to address” arguments 
challenging arbitration and the applicability of state law “once 
it determines whether the FAA applies.”  Id. at 228.  Thus, New 
Prime and Singh instruct that, where the parties have selected 
 
4 The agreement in New Prime provided that it was 
governed by Missouri law and that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate disputes “in accordance with Missouri’s Arbitration 
Act and/or the Federal Arbitration Act.”  Oliveira v. New 
Prime, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 125, 128 (D. Mass. 2015).  Despite 
this language, New Prime sought to compel arbitration under 
the FAA.  See Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 11 (1st 
Cir. 2017) (“[New] Prime moved to compel arbitration under 
the FAA and stay the proceedings.”).  The fact that the movant 
relied on only federal law does not appear to have impacted the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncements about the FAA.  See, e.g., 
New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 537 (“[A] court should decide for 
itself whether § 1’s ‘contracts of employment’ exclusion 
applies before ordering arbitration.”). 
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the FAA as the law that governs arbitration, the court should 
first review whether the FAA covers the relevant class of 
workers.5  
 
 We have applied the same approach even where the 
parties agree that the FAA and/or a specific state’s law 
governs.  In Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3d 
Cir. 2004), for instance, the parties entered an agreement that 
stated the FAA “shall govern the interpretation, enforcement, 
and all proceedings pursuant to this Agreement.  To the extent 
that the [FAA] is inapplicable, Washington law pertaining to 
agreements to arbitrate shall apply.”  Id. at 590.  In Palcko, we 
followed the agreement, which required us to first examine the 
applicability of the FAA, and we concluded based upon the 
type of tasks performed that the worker was exempt under § 1.  
Id. at 593-94.  We then explained that since the FAA does not 
preempt application of state arbitration law, we would, 
consistent with the contract’s text, next examine state law.  Id. 
at 595-96.  Thus, we endorsed determining whether the FAA 
 
5 The majority asserts that the issue of sequencing was 
not addressed in Singh.  They first cite to a part of the Singh 
majority that discussed the sequence of considering various 
sources of factual material.  See 939 F.3d at 227-28.  They then 
cite to the concurrence’s disagreement with the sequence—
addressing the FAA’s applicability first—that the Singh 
majority endorsed.  See 939 F.3d at 231 (Porter, J., 






applies before proceeding to state law, noting that “the effect 
of [the exemption in FAA §] 1 is merely to leave the 
arbitrability of disputes . . . as if the [FAA] had never been 
enacted.”  Id. at 596 (quoting Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Local 
Union No. 560, 443 F.2d 807, 809 (3d Cir. 1971)).  Hence, 
Palcko also shows that the District Court correctly addressed 
the FAA issue before examining state law. 
 
Third, two circuit courts have evaluated the very 
agreement at issue in this case and each first examined, albeit 
without discovery, whether the FAA applies or whether 
employees holding jobs like Harper belong to a class of 
workers exempt from the FAA.  See Rittmann v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 915-19 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. 
Ct. 1374 (2021) (Mem.); Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 
F.3d 10, 17-26 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, --- S. Ct. ----, No. 
20-1077, 2021 WL 2519107 (U.S. June 21, 2021).  Once again, 
given the TOS’s language, our sister circuits first considered 
whether the parties’ chosen law—the FAA—applied before 
turning to state law. 
 
The District Court, relying on and acting in accordance 
with this body of   authority, followed suit.  It correctly 
examined the agreement, observed that the agreement 
exclusively selected the FAA as the law that applied to the 
arbitration provision, sought to determine whether the FAA 
governed the class of workers to which Harper belongs, 
concluded that the factual record was insufficient to make such 
a conclusion, ordered the parties to engage in limited discovery 
consistent with Singh, and declined to reach whether or which 
state law applied pending resolution of whether the expressly 
selected law—the FAA—governed.  Because the District 
Court’s ruling fully comported with the plain language of the 
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parties’ agreement and the binding precedent, I would affirm 
in all respects.   
